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Abstract
This paper uses a dynamic panel approach to explain the determinants of widening 
sovereign bond yield spreads vis-à-vis Germany in selected euro area countries during 
the period end-July 2007 to end-March 2009, when the financial turmoil developed 
into a full-blown financial and economic crisis. Emphasis is given to the role of fiscal 
fundamentals and government announcements of substantial bank rescue packages. 
The paper finds that higher expected budget deficits and/or higher government debt 
ratios relative to Germany contributed to higher government bond yield spreads in the 
euro area during the analysed period. More importantly, the announcements of bank 
rescue packages have led to a re-assessment, from the part of investors, of sovereign 
credit risk, first and foremost through a transfer of risk from the private financial 
sector to the government. 
Keywords: Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Spreads, Fiscal Announcements 
JEL Classification: E62, E43, G12 5
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Non-technical summary 
Since the intensification of the financial crisis in September 2008 up to end-
March 2009, long-term government bond yield spreads relative to Germany have 
increased dramatically for most euro area countries. In March 2009, the spread between 
the Greek government bonds and the German bund widened to almost 300 bps from 
about 35 bps, the average spread after Greece’s accession to EMU. To stop the meltdown 
of the financial system following the default of Lehman Brothers, many euro area 
governments announced broad-based bank rescue packages whereby they committed a 
substantial amount of resources to safeguard confidence in the financial system and 
restore the flow of credit to the economy.  
This paper uses a dynamic panel approach to explain the determinants of 
widening sovereign bond yield spreads in selected euro area countries during the period 
between 31 July 2007 and 25 March 2009. In particular, it looks at the role of fiscal 
fundamentals as determinants of sovereign creditworthiness and pays special attention to 
government announcements of substantial bank rescue packages.   
In line with the existing empirical literature, this paper finds that sovereign bond 
yield spreads in the euro area reflect concerns about a country’s credit risk and liquidity 
risk as well as higher international risk aversion. Higher expected budget deficits and/or 
higher expected government debt relative to Germany have contributed to higher 
government bond yield spreads in the euro area over the period of analysis.  
More importantly, the announcement of bank rescue packages has led to a re-
assessment of sovereign credit risk from the part of investors, through a transfer of risk 
from the private financial sector to the public sector. We also find that the amount of 
resources committed by the governments for the purpose of stabilising the banking sector 
does not have, on average, a statistically significant effect on sovereign bond spreads, 
especially when Ireland is excluded from the analysis. In our view, this shows that 
investors’ discrimination among sovereign borrowers was triggered by governments’ 
credible commitment to extend support to the banking sector, and not by the mere size of 
this support. Investors’ may have believed that governments would provide as much 6
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support as needed to shore up ailing banks regardless of the amounts explicitly 
announced in the first place.  
Our findings are robust to the use of different time frequencies (daily and 
monthly), various estimation techniques, and to the inclusion of additional control 
variables. In this respect, we also found that the reduction in the ECB main refinancing 
operations rate contributed significantly to narrowing sovereign bond spreads for the 
period under consideration. Similarly, private external imbalances relative to Germany 
have an influence on sovereign bond spreads, whereas the expected economic growth rate 
does not seem to matter for the period covered in our analysis. Controlling for other types 
of announcements, such as the release of macroeconomic data and lead indicators, does 
not change our conclusions.  
Our model has a very high predictive power of both average and country-specific 
sovereign bond spreads in the sample. Based on the (average) coefficient estimates from 
our basic model, we find that our explanatory variables contributed, on average, to the 
daily change in sovereign bond spreads in the following maximum proportions: 56% the 
international risk aversion; 21% the expected fiscal position (expected budget balance 
and debt), 14% the liquidity proxy, and 9% the announcement of bank rescue packages. 
The large relevance of international risk aversion in driving changes in sovereign bond 
yield spreads can be ascribed to the extraordinary severeness of the financial crisis during 
the period of our analysis. 
To conclude, the empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates that 
governments with relatively more favourable expected fiscal positions may benefit from 
lower relative borrowing costs in times of crisis. This gives them more room for 
manoeuvre in bearing the additional costs entailed by the bank rescue operations that 
have been critical in safeguarding confidence in and the stability of the financial system. 
The current crisis has thus shown the importance of preserving the public’s trust in the 
soundness of public finances and the need for countries to consolidate during good 
economic times.  7
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I. Introduction 
Since September 2008, for most euro area countries the long-term government 
bond yield spreads to Germany have widened markedly. Since the starting of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and until the first half of 2008, bond yields of 
EMU governments’ debt had generally been relatively close. Over this period, the 
average bond spread of 10-year sovereign bonds, relative to the benchmark German bund, 
had been about 16 basis points (bps).
1 For the Greek 10-year sovereign bonds, the spread 
to the benchmark German bund had been on average just about 30 bps. After the 
intensification of the financial crisis in September 2008, government bond yields 
differentials relative to Germany have increased dramatically for most euro area countries 
and in March 2009 the average spread between the Greek government bond and the 
German bund was about 270 bps.  
This unprecedented surge in sovereign bond yield spreads reflected increasing 
concerns in financial markets about some governments’ capacity to meet their future debt 
obligations. In addition to a higher cost of borrowing, the increase in sovereign bond 
yield spreads may signal that investors are less willing to provide funding to sovereign 
borrowers; thus in the extreme threatening the latter’s ability to access capital markets. 
found evidence of the market-based fiscal discipline hypothesis according to which 
financial markets ask a higher default premium to countries that borrow excessively 
(Goldstein and Woglom 1991; Bayoumi et al. 1995).  
The widening of sovereign bond spreads vis-à-vis Germany was interpreted  
by many observers as a welcome reassessment and differentiation of country
risks. This is also understandable in the context of the European fiscal framework. 
The Stability and Growth Pact not only hinges upon the concept of peer pressure, i.e. that 
European countries among themselves “urge” countries with excessive deficits to correct 
them, but also on the idea that financial markets exert pressure, via higher bond risk 
1 This average is computed for the period January 2000 to July 2008 using daily 10-year sovereign bond 
yield spreads relative to Germany. Greece is included in the sample only since January 2001, the year of 
EMU accession.  The data source is Bloomberg.  
The economic literature on the determinants of long-term government bond yields has 8
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premia, on countries with unsustainable fiscal positions. This differentiation of country 
risk across the euro area was virtually absent before the financial crisis.  
Against this backdrop the question arises: Is the widening of sovereign bond 
spreads observed during the financial crisis indeed an outcome of investors 
differentiating between countries’ fiscal positions and/or macroeconomic fundamentals? 
Or is the widening explained by more general factors such as liquidity risk or 
international risk aversion?   
To shed light on these questions, this paper provides an empirical analysis of the 
determinants of long-term government bond yield spreads for selected euro area countries 
over the period from 31 July 2007 to 25 March 2009. In this way the analysis captures 
developments in bond spreads since the early stages of the financial crisis, when its 
consequences for the euro area appeared limited to a few banks, up to its intensification, 
when uncertainty in financial markets heightened considerably. Indeed, in the euro area 
the first signs of the crisis were felt since end-July 2007, when the German government 
rescued the Deutsche Industriebank (IKB) due to its exposure to the US sub-prime 
mortgage market. 
Largely following the literature, this paper looks at the main determinants of long-
term government bond spreads, such as: (i) a country’s credit risk, as captured in 
particular by the relative soundness of its expected fiscal position; (ii) international risk 
aversion, which in times of heightened uncertainty could be higher for some euro area 
countries than for others; and (iii) market liquidity risk, which may be related to the 
relative size of sovereign bond markets. In addition, given the particular nature of the 
financial crisis period covered in this paper, our empirical analysis also investigates 
whether government announcements of substantial bank rescue packages have 
contributed to the widening of euro area sovereign bond yield spreads and to a transfer of 
credit risk from the private financial sector to the public sector.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides a brief review of the 
literature on the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads. Section III presents 
stylised facts on the developments in long-term government bond yields, gives details 
about data construction and sources and shows descriptive statistics for our main 9
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variables of interest. Section IV describes the basic empirical model and its extensions, 
presents the empirical results, and discusses the model’s goodness-of-fit and various 
robustness checks. The last part presents the conclusions and areas of future research.  
II. Literature  review 
The literature on the determinants of government bond yield spreads lists several 
factors influencing the risk premia paid by governments relative to the benchmark 
government bond. First, sovereign bond spreads are influenced by a country’s 
creditworthiness as reflected by its fiscal and macroeconomic position (the so-called 
“credit risk”). Second, liquidity risk, i.e. the size and depth of the government’s bond 
market, plays a role. Third, government bond spreads reflect international risk aversion, 
i.e. investor sentiment towards this asset class for each country. Finally, and related to 
credit risk, the effect of announcements, for example, macroeconomic news/surprises or 
fiscal policy events (e.g. government plans) might also play a role in the development of 
sovereign bond spreads. Since the analysis in this paper covers the period from the 
beginning of the crisis in financial markets (i.e. August 2007) until the end of March 
2009, that is, the period during which the (presumed) sovereign yield differentiation 
based on countries’ credit risk intensified, this review focuses on the role of credit risk 
and announcements. 
For developed countries, a range of empirical literature has found a significant 
impact of fiscal variables on risk premia, in particular with regard to the level of public 
debt. For the U.S., a seminal paper by Goldstein and Woglom (1992) finds evidence that 
the debt level of U.S. states has a positive impact on their bond yield relative to that of 
other states. Further evidence in this direction was provided by Bayoumi et al. (1995) and 
Poterba and Rueben (1999). Regarding the fiscal deficit, Laubach (2009) estimates the 
effect of the five-year ahead projection of the U.S. government deficit, as provided by the 
Office of Management and Budget, on the level of the five year ahead real Treasury yield. 
He finds a significant impact of deficits and debt on long-term interest rates, isolating the 
effects of the business cycle and associated monetary policy actions. However, he finds 
no evidence that yield spreads between corporate and sovereign bonds (as a proxy for 10
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changes in the sovereign risk) are systematically related to expected fiscal balances. 
Finally, for the OECD countries, Alesina et al. (1992) analyse the yield differential 
between sovereign and corporate bonds and find that it depends positively on the public 
debt level. 
For European and, in particular, EMU countries, several studies tend to point to a 
significant impact of government debt and (not quite unambiguously) deficit on 
sovereign bond spreads.
2 Faini (2006) finds a significant effect of fiscal deficit and debt 
levels on the aggregate EMU interest rate level, as well as on sovereign bond spreads in a 
model with identical slope coefficients across countries. Bernoth et al. (2004) find that 
fiscal fundamentals, as proxied by the budget balance or the government debt, have a 
significant impact on sovereign bond spreads for a pooled sample of 13 EU countries. 
Similar results are obtained by Hallerberg and Wolff (2006) using fixed effects panel 
estimations. With a similar econometric approach Bernoth and Wolff (2008) focus on the 
accuracy of government-reported fiscal data and find a spread-reducing impact of fiscal 
transparency in addition to a positive impact of deficits but not debt. Codogno et al. 
(2003) in their Seemingly Unrelated Regressions analysis (SUR) of government bond 
spreads, use public debt as the only proxy for a country’s fiscal position and find that 
only for Italy and Spain fluctuations in yield differentials can be attributed to domestic 
fiscal fundamentals, whereas for the other countries in the sample (e.g. Belgium, France 
and Portugal) international risk-related factors seem to matter more. By contrast, 
assuming that it is expected fiscal developments rather than past outcomes that matter for 
investment decisions, Heppke-Falk and Hüfner (2004) analyse whether expected budget 
deficits, derived from the Consensus Forecasts, have an impact on interest rate swap 
spreads of France, Germany and Italy. Using a SUR framework, they find no such 
evidence for the period 1994-2004. However, they find that since July 1997 (after the 
Stability and Growth Pact had been signed) market discipline (i.e. markets’ sensitivity to 
public finance outcomes) increased in Germany and France (but not in Italy) and for 
Germany also after the start of EMU in 1999. Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) find that 
2 For a literature review and empirical investigation of government bond spreads in emerging markets using 
expected fiscal positions see Nickel et al. (2009). 11
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in the euro area, bond spreads are largely driven by the level of short-term interest rates 
(i.e. common international risk), while credit risk and liquidity risk still matter in EMU.   
Finally, event study analyses have shown that announcements, for example of 
macroeconomic data, have a discernable impact on government bond spreads, especially 
on shorter-term horizons. Existing papers applied to the euro area government bond 
markets, find that US data releases not only affect US markets but also exert a significant 
effect on European bond markets. In a dynamic model of intra-day bond returns for long -
term German government bonds, Andersson et al. (2006) use announcements of euro area, 
German, French and Italian macroeconomic releases, in addition to US announcements, 
and find significant effects on the prices of long term bonds. Codogno et al. (2003) 
find that fiscal announcements about the initiation of excessive deficit procedures for 
Germany and Portugal have affected bond spreads only for Portugal. By contrast, Afonso 
and Strauch (2004) show that there is no persistent and systematic reaction of the default 
risk premium to the identified fiscal policy events during 2002, even if some specific 
events had a significant and temporary impact on swap spreads. 
As to the role of other factors, such as the liquidity risk premium, the literature 
does not provide clear-cut evidence on its relative importance versus credit risk for 
sovereign bond markets. Compared to studies that emphasize credit risk, several papers, 
such as Gomez-Puig (2006) and Beber et al. (2009) find that liquidity risk is a highly 
relevant (even the most important) factor in explaining sovereign bond spreads after the 
introduction of the euro and in times of heightened uncertainty respectively. 
The role of a common international risk factor, as one of the main explanatory 
variables for sovereign spreads, is underlined in several studies, such as Codogno et al. 
(2003), Geyer et al. (2004), Barrios et al. (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009). The 
international risk factor is found to have a larger impact in countries with high 
government debt ratios (Codogno et al. 2003) and to magnify the impact of fiscal 
variables on yield spreads in crisis times (Haugh et al. 2009; Barrios et al. 2009). 
To conclude, the review of the empirical literature provides, on balance, evidence 
for a significant impact of fiscal fundamentals in explaining sovereign bond spreads in 
normal economic times. The role of fiscal announcements is less well analysed and the 12
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existing evidence is weak. This paper contributes to the existing empirical literature by 
looking at the impact of these factors during the economic and financial crisis that has hit 
the euro area and the world markets since September 2008.  
III.  Stylised facts and data description 
Our empirical analysis covers the period from end-July 2007, when the first signs 
of increasing turmoil in global financial markets became visible, until about end-March 
2009.
3  The dependent variable is the daily 10-year government bond yield spreads 
relative to Germany for the following ten euro area countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
4
Since the start of stage three of the EMU
5 and until the onset of the financial crisis, 
10-year government bond yields for euro area countries converged and differentials vis-à-
vis Germany became very low. Since September 2008, when the financial turmoil 
intensified, spreads started to widen considerably, as shown in Chart 1. In particular, 
countries such as Greece and Ireland experienced the largest increase in their bond 
spreads, followed by Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Spain (Table 1).  
3 This was the time when we finalised the collection of our dataset; it also coincided with the period the 
financial markets started to gradually stabilise.   
4 The remaining euro area countries (i.e. Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia) are not  
included in the analysis for two main reasons. First of all, information on 10-year government bond yields is 
not readily available for these euro area countries as their government bond markets are relatively small. 
Secondly, the countries included in the analysis are those that have announced bank rescue packages to 
support the banking sector since September 2008. The construction of the dependent variable is in line 
with existing empirical studies (Codogno et al. 2003; Manganelli and Wolswijk 2009).  
5 The tightening of sovereign bond spreads was mainly associated to the lower liquidity premia being asked 
by markets as a result of the increasing integration of financial markets. 13
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Chart 1: Ten-year government bond yields of euro area countries (monthly averages; 
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Source: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.  
Table 1: Ten-year government bond spreads: descriptive statistics 
 (31/07/2007 to 25/03/2009; bps) 
Country   Mean   St. dev.  Min  Max 
Greece   93  80  26  300 
Ireland 74  74  14  284 
Italy   67  41  24  159 
Portugal 57  39  20  176 
Austria   37  34  5  137 
Spain 41  33  8  128 
Belgium 44  30  11  138 
Finland 28  25  7  89 
Netherlands   28  22  7  87 
France   24  15  6  63 
Sources: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations. 
As already introduced in the literature review section, long-term government bond 
yield spreads are likely to depend on three sets of factors: (i) countries’ credit risk, as 
captured particularly by indicators of fiscal positions; (ii) markets’ liquidity risk, and (iii) 
degree of international risk aversion.  14
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Credit Risk Variables  
The most commonly used indicators of a country’s fiscal position are the general 
government debt and deficit ratio. Several papers also use the debt service ratio, interest 
payments as a share of GDP (Bernoth et al. 2004), a country’s credit rating (Manganelli 
and Wolswijk 2009), and in some cases dummies on fiscal announcements (Afonso and 
Strauch (2004). Our analysis looks at the role of a country’s fiscal position in determining 
its bond spreads vis-à-vis Germany, but also at whether the announcement of broad based 
bank rescue packages had some effects on investor’s assessment of credit risk (i.e. we 
control for the announcement effect).  
However, unlike most previous studies for the euro area
6, our analysis does not 
use historical fiscal data, but the expected general government budget balance and debt 
ratios. These variables are taken from the European Commission Forecasts that are 
released on a bi-annual basis. For each country, we compute the average for a 2-year 
period of the expected budget balance and debt ratio, using the European Commission 
forecasts available at each point in time, and we take differences vis-à-vis Germany. In 
this way, our explanatory variables are consistent with the specification of the dependent 
variable.
7 Since a worsening of the expected fiscal position (i.e. higher expected deficits 
and/or higher expected debt ratios) could signal to investors increasing risks to the 
sustainability of a country’s fiscal policy, in our analysis the expected sign on the 
expected general government budget balance is negative and the expected sign on the 
expected debt ratio is positive.  
The rationale for including expected rather than historical fiscal data in our 
analysis relies on the assumption that at each point in time investors form their 
expectations about a country’s fiscal position on the basis of the available information at 
that time. Given its prominent role in the application of the EU fiscal surveillance 
framework, we assume that investors use the European Commission’s forecast as a 
reliable source of information to form their expectations.  
6 Several studies, such as Heppke-Falk and Huefner (2004), Haugh et al. (2009), Barrios et al. (2009),
Sgherri and Zoli (2009), use expected fiscal variables in explaining sovereign bond spreads in the euro area.  
7 In our daily database the value of the budget balance (debt ratio) is updated every time new forecasts are 
published by the Commission.   15
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A potential drawback of these data is their low frequency (bi-annual) as opposed 
to the high frequency of our dependent variable. An alternative approach would be to use 
fiscal forecasts released on a monthly basis by professional forecasters, e.g. the 
Consensus Forecast is an example. However, since not all countries in our sample are 
covered in these monthly forecasts, this approach would limit the scope of our analysis. 
Chart 2 below plots the ten-year government bond yield spreads over Germany 
for the euro area countries under consideration against their expected budget balance 
relative to Germany, both variables averaged over the period of our analysis. The chart 
shows that countries that are expected to have a less favourable budget balance compared 
to Germany have experienced larger bond yield differentials. France is an outlier in this 
respect, as it has experienced only a slight increase in its ten-year government bond yield 
differential to Germany despite its higher budget deficit. This may be explained by the 
relatively lower liquidity premium that France may benefit from compared with other 
countries under consideration, as well as lower perceived vulnerability to the financial 
turmoil.  
Chart 2: Ten-year government bond yield spreads of euro area countries over Germany and the 
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Sources: Bloomberg, European Commission and ECB staff calculations. 
Note: For each country, the average expected budget balance for 2007, 2008 and 2009 is computed using 
vintages of the European Commission forecasts available at each point in time.  16
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Interestingly, with the exception of Ireland, the countries that experienced the 
largest increase in their sovereign bond yield spreads (see also Table 1 and Chart 1), are 
those that entered the crisis with high deficits (and debt ratios). By contrast, as it will be 
shown below (see Table 2), the size of the bank rescue packages announced by the 
individual countries had no significant impact on the widening of bond spreads. 
Therefore, the crisis seems to have triggered a flight to quality effect whereby investors 
started to discriminate among sovereign borrowers on the basis of their fiscal outlook.  
Given the particular nature of the period of financial crisis covered in our analysis, 
we expect that the announcements of bank rescue packages may have also affected 
investors’ perceptions of euro area countries credit risk.
8 To capture this announcement 
effect, we construct a country dummy variable which equals 0 before the date of the 
announcement and 1 as of that date. We assume that investors may have interpreted the 
governments’ decision to support the banking sector as an indicator of future higher fiscal 
burden, thus asking higher premia on their debt. Therefore, the expected sign on the 
dummy variable is positive. 
Bank rescue packages were directed at banks experiencing liquidity and/or solvency 
problems. Financial support schemes included: (i) government guarantees for interbank 
lending and new debt issued by banks; (ii) the recapitalisation of financial institutions in 
difficulty; (iii) asset relief schemes and (iv) higher retail deposit insurance. These support 
measures were announced in the aftermath of the default of Lehman Brothers, between 
end-September and end-October 2008. Although all countries acted within the common 
guidelines setup by the European Action Plan
9, the timing of adoption of the measures 
differed across countries and it was not clear a priori whether all of them would provide 
such support, or what its precise shape would be. Ireland, for example, announced its 
blanket guarantee scheme on all deposits and debts of both domestic banks and foreign 
subsidiaries well ahead of the European Action Plan. Furthermore, whereas some 
countries adopted broad-based schemes consisting of both guarantees and recapitalisation 
measures (Germany, Austria, Greece, Spain, France and the Netherlands), some other 
8  We do not consider the fiscal stimulus packages to boost aggregate demand announced by euro area 
governments. Their effect on the fiscal variables would already be captured by the expected budget deficits 
and debt ratios, given their direct statistical recording, thus making the two sets of variables strongly 
correlated. 
9 The concerted European action plan of the euro area countries was adopted on 12 October 2008. 17
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(Belgium, Luxembourg) did not announce a general scheme, but carried out ad hoc
interventions to support individual institutions. Therefore, by recording the exact date of 
announcement of the government support measures, our dummy variable is able to 
capture the announcement effect related to the adoption of bank rescue packages by each 
country in our sample.  
The amount of resources committed varied across countries to a great extent. 
Ireland, for example, announced a guarantee scheme of € 400 billion, including the retail 
bank deposit guarantee, which amounts to more than 200% of its GDP. Countries such as 
the Netherlands, Austria and Germany committed resources above 20% of their GDP. 
Overall, the total amount of resources committed to bank rescue packages between mid-
September and mid-October 2008 amounted to about 23% of the euro area GDP.  
Table 2: Bank rescue packages (as % of country GDP) 






AT  13/10/08 5.0  26.0 
BE 26/09/08 5.1  74.0 
DE  06/10/08 3.5  19.0 
ES 07/10/08 2.8  9.1 
FI 20/10/08 2.1  26.4 
FR 30/09/08 2.0  16.4 
GR 15/10/08 5.2  6.0 
IE 29/09/08 5.0  259.0 
IT 08/10/08 3.0  - 
NL  26/09/08 18.0  33.7 
PT 13/10/08 2.3  11.9 
Note: The table reflects the cumulative amounts of bank rescue packages as   
released in some countries in subsequent announcements.  
*Includes retail deposit guarantees.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Using information available on the size of the bank rescue packages we construct 
two additional variables, namely: the size of recapitalisation and the size of guarantees.
For each country in the sample we record the size of bank rescue packages as initially 
announced by governments between end-September and end-October 2008, separately 
for bank recapitalisations and guarantees.
10  To these amounts we add any individual 
operations announced outside the packages over the period between 31 July 2007 and  
25 March 2009. Therefore, for each day (or month) of the sample period, the value of the 
10 For Italy, we consider the size of government guarantees as percent of GDP to be zero.  18
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variable is the cumulative amount of bank rescue measures announced until that moment, 
expressed as percent of the respective country’s GDP. 
Concurrent to the announcement of bank rescue packages, pressures on the 
financial sector seemed to have eased whereas the opposite occurred at the general 
government level. This was felt through a sharp increase in sovereign credit default swap 
(CDS) premia for most euro area countries, whereas the CDS premia for European 
financial corporations (i.e. those covered by the iTraxx financial index)
11, reversed their 
upward trend and started to decline. Chart 3 illustrates these developments and depicts 
the cumulative changes since mid-September 2008 in average five-year sovereign CDS 
premia for 11 euro area countries and in the CDS premia for European financial 
institutions covered by the iTraxx index.  
Chart 3: Cumulative changes in average five-year sovereign CDS premia for euro area countries 



































Sources: Datastream and ECB staff calculations. 
Note: The vertical bars indicate the dates on which bank rescue packages were announced in euro area countries.
Until end-September 2008 average sovereign CDS premia had been very low and 
stable. The dramatic rise in CDS premia for most euro area countries after the 
11 The iTraxx financial index contains the CDS spreads of 25 European financial institutions, including 
institutions from the United Kingdom and Switzerland. The CDS premia represent the cost of insuring 
against the event of default of sovereign debt and corporate financial debt respectively. 19
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announcements of bank rescue packages, broadly coinciding with the Irish guarantee 
scheme (29 September 2008), and the fact that they remained at elevated levels for a 
prolonged period of time point to a reassessment of countries’ credit risk. At the same 
time, CDS premia for financial institutions declined. All in all this would suggest that the 
broad-based bank rescue packages have alleviated some credit risk in the banking sector 
and brought about a transfer of credit risk from the private  financial to the public sector. 
Our empirical analysis tests the credit risk transfer hypothesis through the impact of the 
announcement of bank rescue packages on the difference between sovereign CDS premia
and  CDS premia for European financial corporations. Under this hypothesis, the 
announcement of bank rescue packages should lead to a widening of the difference 
between the sovereign and the corporate CDS premia. Daily data are from Bloomberg. 
Since we look at premia rather than spreads, Germany is also part of the analysis. A closer 
look at developments in CDS premia during the period of the analysis shows that they 
have differed quite substantially across countries. On the one hand, CDS premia for Ireland, 
Greece, Austria and Italy experienced high volatility and rose to above 200 bps at the peak 
of the financial crisis. On other hand, CDS premia for Germany, France and Finland were 
much less volatile (see Chart 4 and Table 3).  20
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Chart 4: Sovereign CDS premia (levels) for euro area countries (bp), daily data 15 September 
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Source: Bloomberg. 
Table 3: Five-year sovereign CDS premia: descriptive statistics 
(31/07/2007 to 25/03/2009; bps) 
 Country  Mean   St. dev.  Min  Max 
Ireland   78  94  4  365 
Greece   91  81  15  282 
Austria   48  64  2  260 
Italy   71  57  16  205 
Spain 57  40  6  165 
Belgium 42 38  5  153 
Portugal   56  37  12  157 
Netherlands   32  37  3  126 
Finland   39  26  11  94 
France   26  25  2  97 
Germany   22  22  2  91 
Source: Bloomberg and authors’calculation. 
Liquidity Risk Variable  
Liquidity factors also play a role in determining sovereign bond spreads. High 
liquidity is usually associated with lower yields in equilibrium, as more liquid bonds can 
be traded more easily, thus carrying lower transaction costs. Liquidity conditions can 21
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vary across sovereign issues depending on the trading volumes, the amounts of bonds 
outstanding, the trading activity of market makers and the efficiency of the secondary 
market. 
Measures of liquidity differ widely across studies. Bid/ask spreads are often used 
as a measure of the cost incurred by investors in unwinding an asset position. Trading 
volumes, turnover ratios and trading intensity are used as measures of how frequently a 
given asset is traded in the market in a given period. Finally, a less traditional measure of 
liquidity is the amount of outstanding government debt which represents a measure of 
market depth. Codogno et al. (2003) use three different measures of liquidity (i.e. bid/ask 
spread, trading volume and turnover ratio) and find that trading volumes are the best 
performing liquidity indicator. Bernoth et al. (2004) use the size of government bond 
markets (i.e. the amount of debt issued by a country as a share of total debt in the EU) as 
an indicator of liquidity and find a significant effect of this variable on the yield 
differentials of euro area countries. Similarly, Gómez-Puig (2006) uses bid/ask spread 
and the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt as measures of liquidity and finds 
that both measures played a role in the widening of sovereign bond spreads since the 
EMU.  However, according to some authors the main drawback of the bid/ask spread 
measure is that it is not truly exogenous, as they depend on some features of the 
marketplace where they are determined (Dunne et al. 2006).   
In line with Bernoth et al. (2004) and Gómez-Puig (2006), our analysis includes a 
proxy for liquidity expressed as the size of the government bond markets (i.e. the amount 
of gross government debt issuance). For each country in the sample, total debt issuance 
is taken as a share of the euro area bond market and the difference to the German ratio is 
computed. Since better liquidity conditions in the government bond market are expected 
to lead to lower yields, our liquidity proxy is expected to have a negative sign. Data 
are available on a quarterly basis and are taken from the ECB Securities Issues 
Statistics. As an alternative measure for liquidity, in line with Codogno et al. (2003), we 
also use traded volumes of total government securities maturing at 9- to 11-years relative 
to Germany which are available from Datastream at a monthly frequency. However, 
this variable has a weak or no significance in our model, while the sign stays the same as 
in the case of gross government debt issuance.  22
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International Risk Aversion  
A common finding of the empirical literature is that besides country specific 
factors, sovereign bond spreads are driven by a single-time varying common factor, 
which is typically associated with shifts in international risk appetite. A proxy for 
international risk aversion frequently used in the literature, is the spread between the yield 
on AAA US corporate bonds and the yield on the 10-year US government bonds 
(Codogno et al. 2003; Manganelli and Wolswijk 2009). A widening of the spread is 
meant to capture shifts in investors’ preferences from the riskier private sector assets 
towards safer government bonds. Other studies (e.g. Sgherri and Zoli 2009) estimate 
the common risk factor by using a simple asset pricing model.  
Following Codogno et al. (2003) our measure for international risk aversion is 
computed as the spread between the US AAA corporate bonds and the US 10-year 
sovereign bonds. In line with other studies we expect a positive sign for this variable in 
our analysis.  
Table A1 in Appendix 1 summarises the variables in our dataset.  
IV. The empirical model and results  
This section introduces a simple estimation model to analyse the determinants of 
sovereign bond spreads and to assess whether a transfer of risk from the private financial 
to the public sector occurred as result of government intervention to support the banking 
sector. Moreover, we gauge the predictive power of the model by quantifying the relative 
contributions of our main explanatory variables to the change in sovereign bond spreads 
during the period of analysis.  
IV.1. The basic model
Given the high persistency in our dependent variable - the level of bond yield 
spreads today depends also on past values - our preferred specification is a dynamic panel 
model. Moreover, we estimate the model using both daily and monthly data as a 
robustness check and in an attempt to mitigate persistency in the dependent variable. 23
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Hence, the following empirical model (Equation (1)) is used to explain 10-year 
government bond yield spreads over Germany (spread) in ten euro area countries.  
( (1)
ANN is our country dummy variable on the announcements of bank rescue 
packages
12; E(FISC) denotes governments’ expected fiscal positions, as given by the 
general government balance and/or gross government debt in percent of GDP, relative to 
Germany;  Intl.Risk  is our proxy for international risk aversion; LIQ is a proxy for 
liquidity of euro area governments’ bond markets;  it H is the error term. 
The empirical methodology uses the Feasible Generalised Least Squares (FGLS) 
estimator, corrected for heteroskedasticity across panels and panel-specific AR(1) 
autocorrelation. The model is estimated using daily, as well as monthly averages for the 
dependent variable for the period from 31 July 2007 to 25 March 2009. Estimation 
results of Equation (1) are shown in Table 4 below. For both time frequencies model 1 
includes both the expected budget balance and expected government debt, model 2 
includes only the expected budget balance and model 3 only the expected government 
debt.  
Table 4: Panel regression to explain 10-year government bond yield spreads over Germany 
Daily data    Monthly data  
Variables Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Spread (t-1)    0.9829***   0.9851***   0.9842***   0.9714***   0.9716***   0.9704*** 
ANN 0.0046**    0.0039*    0.0049**    0.0438*      0.0429*  0.0582** 
Exp. budget bal.   -0.0007**  -0.0010*** - -0.0157***  -0.0157***  - 
Exp. gov. debt    0.0001**  -   0.0001***    0.0001  -  0.0008** 
Intl.Risk   0.0041***   0.0037***   0.0035***  0.0312**  0.0314**    0.0262* 
Liquidity (GDI)  -0.0037*** -0.0033*** -0.0028*** -0.0322***  -0.0321***  -0.0233*** 
_cons    0.0024*    0.0016    0.0025*   -0.0048     -0.0052    0.0074 
Number obs. (N)  4212  4212  4212  196  196  196 
Note: The dependent variable is spreadsit. The dependent variable and the explanatory variable Intl.Risk are expressed 
in percentage points. The abbreviations for the explanatory variables are explained in the text above (Exp. budget bal.
and Exp. gov. debt denote the expected budget balance and, respectively, gross government debt). 
12 The variables included in equation (1) are specified in terms of differentials to Germany. However, the 
ANN variable can not be defined as a differential to Germany being based on calendar dates. Therefore, 
to ensure consistency in the model specification, in the construction of the dummy variable ANN, we
dropped the dates of the announcement of bank rescue packages by Germany. 
it it t it it it it LIQ Risk Intl FISC E ANN spread spread H E E E E U D          4 3 2 1 1 . ) ( ) (
Countries included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain.  The table shows the estimated coefficients and their significance level (*10%; **5%, ***1%).  24
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The first lag of the dependent variable is highly significant and is indicative of the 
high persistency in spreads even when monthly frequencies are used, though the size of 
the coefficient is slightly smaller in the latter case. However, we find that past values 
alone do not explain the widening of bond yield spreads over the period of our analysis. 
Our estimates show that a higher expected budget balance and/or higher expected 
government debt relative to Germany is on average associated with higher government 
bond yield spreads for the euro area countries in our sample. Moreover, the expected 
budget balance is robust to all specifications and its coefficient increases substantially 
when monthly frequencies are used. The expected government debt is less robust with 
monthly data, as it loses significance when used together with the budget balance in the 
regression equation. This suggests that in periods of heightened economic uncertainty, 
the expected fiscal deficit seems to have a larger impact on the movements in sovereign 
bond spreads. 
Liquidity risk is found to play a role as government bond yield spreads seem to be 
lower the higher the liquidity in the government bond market. Similarly, the higher the 
international risk aversion the higher sovereign bond yield spreads.  
Turning to the announcements of bank rescue packages, our estimates show that 
the government announcements to support the banking sector have increased, on average, 
the perceived risk of government borrowing compared with Germany. The size of the 
coefficient increases when the model is estimated using monthly frequencies, although its 
significance is lower in this case, especially when used in conjunction with the budget 
balance (model 1+2). The results remain robust if we restrict the period of the analysis to 
start from September 2008 instead of end-July 2007. Interestingly, the regression results 
also remain unaffected if Ireland is excluded from the panel. This evidence shows that 
investors’ discrimination across sovereign borrowers was triggered by the governments’ 
credible commitment to extend support to the banking sector. Investors may have 
anticipated that governments would provide as much support as needed to shore up ailing 
banks regardless of the amounts explicitly announced in the first place (i.e. in case of 
systemic banking risk, significant implicit guarantees may add-up to the explicit ones).  25
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This evidence is supported if we investigate the impact of the announced size 
of bank rescue operations on investors’ perception of euro area governments’ borrowing 
risk relative to Germany. To this purpose we replace the ANN variable in Equation (1) 
with the two Size variables taken as differences relative to Germany and we drop 
expected government debt which reflects part of the impact from bank recapitalisation 
operations. Table 5 below presents the estimation results when the model is run using 
monthly frequencies.
Table 5: Panel regression to explain spreads using the size of bank rescue packages 
Variable 
(Monthly data) 
m1                 
Dynamic panel   
Recap. + Guarantee 
m2                
Dynamic panel   
Guarantee 
m3               
Dynamic panel   
Recap.  
m4                 
Dynamic panel   
Recap. + Guarantee 
(excl. IE) 
Spread (t-1)    0.9660***   0.9672***    0.9643***  0.9517*** 
Size recap.            0.0021  -         0.0031           0.0025 
Size guarantee    0.0005***   0.0006***  -          -0.0008 
Exp budget bal  -0.0161***  -0.0141***  -0.0203***          -0.0129*** 
Int'l Risk   0.0445***   0.0461***    0.0464***  0.0488*** 
Liquidity (GDI)  -0.0325***  -0.0302***  -0.0380***  -0.0307*** 
_cons           -0.0191*        -0.0220**        -0.0194*          -0.0202* 
No. of observations. 196 196  196 179 
Note: The dependent variable is spreadsit. The abbreviations for the explanatory variables are explained in the text 
above (“Size recap.” represents the cumulative size of bank recapitalisation; “Size guarantee” represents the cumulative 
size of bank guarantee, both as % of GDP and relative to the size of packages extended by Germany). Model m1 
includes both variables Size recap. and Size guarantee; m2 includes only Size guarantee; m3 includes only Size recap. 
and m4 includes both variables but excludes Ireland from the sample, while m1 - m3 are run on the entire sample. The 
table shows the estimated coefficients and their significance level (*10%; **5%, ***1%).  
When Equation (1) is estimated including the size of the packages, the 
significance of the expected budget balance remains unaffected, whereas the impact of 
the new variables is less conclusive. When daily data are used we find that the size of 
both government guarantees and bank recapitalisations has no impact on government 
bond yield spreads. When monthly data are used (i.e. those reported in Table 5), we find 
that the relative size of guarantees extended by governments to the banking sector has 
contributed to the widening of sovereign bond yield spreads for the period of our analysis. 
However, this result is driven by Ireland, which is an extreme outlier in terms of the size 
of guarantees to the banking sector. If we eliminate Ireland from the panel, then the 
relative size of guarantees is not significantly related to the widening of government bond 
yield spreads. The size of recapitalisations is weakly significant only when included 
separately in the regression equation.  26
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The absence of, or at best weak, correlation between the size of bank rescue 
packages announced by the countries in our sample and the widening in sovereign bond 
yield spreads is not surprising. As discussed in Section III, with the exception of Ireland, 
the countries that experienced the highest volatility and the largest increase in their bond 
spreads are not those that have committed the largest amount of resources to the bank 
rescue packages. The evidence presented in this section is that a country’s expected fiscal 
position matters for investors’ perception of its credit risk. It can be argued that the size 
of bank rescue packages depends, on average, on the country’s fiscal room for 
manoeuvre: countries with limited fiscal space committed relatively less resources for the 
purpose of broad-based rescue packages.
13
To conclude, investors seem to have reacted on average more forcefully to the 
announcement of financial support whereas they have been less responsive to the size of 
the packages, except in the case of Ireland whose package size was extremely large.  
IV.2. The credit risk transfer hypothesis 
As discussed in Section III, the announcements of broad-based bank rescue 
packages may have signalled to investors the governments’ commitment to take over part 
of the risks and liabilities from ailing financial institutions. This may have led to a 
reassessment of sovereign credit risk vis-à-vis the private financial sector, possibly 
reflected in an increase in the sovereign CDS premia and a decrease (or lower increase) in 
CDS premia of the private financial sector. To test this hypothesis, we regress the 
differential between sovereign CDS premia and the iTraxx financials over the same 
variables as in Equation (1), but the proxy for liquidity in the government bond market, 
as CDS premia does not incorporate a liquidity risk premium. Table 6 below shows the 
results using a dynamic panel model and a fixed effects model (FE) for all eleven 
countries of the euro area considered, including Germany. We find evidence of the 
transfer of credit risk hypothesis as the estimated coefficient of the ANN variable is 
positive and highly statistically significant across all model specifications, meaning that 
13  Moreover, a fixed effect estimate of the size of bank rescue packages on the historical values of 
government debt and deficit shows indeed that both the size of budget deficits and the amount of 
government debt have a negative and significant impact on the size of the rescue package.  27
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the announcement of bank rescue packages led to a widening of the differential between 
the sovereign and the private financial CDS premia for the period of analysis. This 
evidence is confirmed when we run two separate regressions having sovereign CDS 
premia and iTraxx financials as dependent variables respectively. We find that the 
coefficient of the ANN variable is positive in the regression explaining sovereign CDS, 
implying an increase in the sovereign credit risk as a result of the announcements, and it 
is negative in the regression explaining iTraxx, implying a reduction of risk for the 
financial corporate sector.  
Table 6: Panel regression to explain the transfer of risk from the private banking  
sector to the government   
Daily Monthly 
Variables  Model 1 
(Dynamic) 




Model 2        
(FE) 
(CDS gov – ItraxxFin) (t-1) 0.9851*** -    0.6065***  - 
ANN 0.0253***   0.5278***   0.6023***   0.7479*** 
Exp. budget bal.      -0.0000  -0.0905***  -0.0303***  -0.1037*** 
Intl. Risk  -0.0116*** -0.2662*** -0.2920***  -0.4655*** 
Time trend -   0.0005*** - 0.0242** 
Country dummies  - Included -  Included 
_cons   0.0103***  -0.0995***   0.2159***       0.271 
Number obs. (N)  4449  4492  210  221 
R-sq adj.    0.35    0.41 
Note: The dependent variable is the difference between sovereign’ Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia and CDS premia 
for iTraxx financials (CDSgov it – ItraxxFin t). Countries included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In this analysis, the expected budget balance is 
expressed as % of GDP (value by country) and not in spreads to Germany. Therefore, unlike in Table 4 above, the 
ANN variable also includes the bank rescue package announced by Germany (also see footnote 12).  
The table shows the estimated coefficients and their significance level (*10%; **5%, ***1%). 
On the other hand, the Intl.Risk variable has a negative and significant coefficient. 
We interpret this as an indication that, all other factors constant, higher international risk 
aversion hit more forcefully the creditworthiness of the European financial sector than 
that of the euro area governments. Again, if we run two separate regressions on sovereign 
CDS premia and iTraxx financials as dependent variables, we find that the coefficient of 
the Intl.Risk variable is positive in both regressions but its size is much larger in the 
regression explaining iTraxx financials.
14
Finally, the ANN variable also seems to have had a higher economic impact 
compared with the international risk aversion (the coefficient of ANN is higher than that 
14 Results are available upon request. 28
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of Intl.Risk across all specifications). This implies that the net effect of the two factors 
has been a higher relative increase of risk in the government sector vis-à-vis the private 
financial sector.  
IV.3. Predictive power and relative contribution of factors 
In this section, we gauge the predictive power of our basic model and attempt to 
measure the relative contributions of our main regressors to the change in spreads, both 
on average for the panel and for each country separately. When computing the relative 
contributions, we transfer the first lag of the dependent variable to the LHS of Equation 
(1), thus broadly explaining the contribution of our variables of interest (fiscal variables; 
liquidity risk and international risk aversion) to the change in sovereign bond yield 
spreads.
15
Thus, for country i the contribution to the change in spread of each variable is 
calculated as the product between the average value of that variable across time for 
country  i,  and its coefficient estimate from Table 4, dynamic model 1 (daily). The 
relative contribution of each variable is then calculated as the ratio between the absolute 
value of the contribution (as calculated above) and the sum of the absolute value of the 
contributions of all (statistically significant) variables in the model.
16
For example, the relative contribution of the ANN variable is calculated as follows:  
i t i t i t i t i t
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where  1 ˆ E   represents the regression coefficient of the variable ANN in model 1 (daily) 
(i.e. 0.0046) taken in absolute value; 
i t ANN   is the average value over time of the 
variable ANN, taken in absolute value, for each country i. The other four variables (i.e. 
expected budget balance, expected gross government debt, the liquidity proxy and 
                                                
15 More specifically, we assume that it it it y y y ' #  1 U . In the analysis we only include those explanatory 
variables that are statistically significant.  
16 We follow the methodology in Beber et al. (2009).   29
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international risk aversion), as well as their corresponding coefficients, are expressed in a 
similar manner. 
Table 7 summarizes these results. Column 2 represents the actual values of the 
dependent variable (spreadsit) averaged over the period of the analysis, while column 3 
shows the averaged predicted values. The predictive power of the basic model is very 
high for the sample as a whole (up to the 1/100
th basis point). By country, the predictive 
power of the model is also large, differences being in the range of 1/10
th basis point - the 
largest difference seems to be for Finland, about 2 basis points, while for Greece and 
Ireland, the difference is about 1 basis point.  
Table 7: Predictive power of the basic model and relative contributions of the explanatory factors   
Maximum relative contribution of the main factors in explaining the 
daily change in sovereign spreads over Germany (%) 
















AT 0.3743  0.3763 12.3  2.8  4.7  4.5 75.7 
BE 0.4427  0.4443 10.1  1.5 14.3 16.9 57.2 
ES 0.4139  0.4124  9.9  0.6 19.3 11.0 59.2 
FI 0.2802  0.2999 7.8  19.5  19.9 3.0  49.9 
FR 0.2374  0.2375  6.6  8.9  1.2 42.6 40.7 
GR 0.9318  0.9229 8.9  8.5  20.7 6.5  55.5 
IE 0.7397  0.7306 9.8  10.2  21.7 2.2  56.1 
IT 0.6718  0.6678  6.4  6.2 19.6 29.2 38.6 
NL 0.2795  0.2794  8.8  5.3 12.6 19.8 53.5 
PT 0.5701  0.5695 11.3  14.1  1.7  3.5 69.5 
average 
sample-DE  0.4942  0.4940  9.2  7.7 13.6 13.9 55.6 
Note: The results presented are obtained based on the dynamic Model 1 with daily data (see column 2 of Table 1 for 
details of the model and estimated coefficients).  
For the whole panel, the average factor contribution is calculated by averaging the 
values of the explanatory variables both across time and countries. According to these 
calculations, our explanatory variables have contributed, on average, to the daily change 
in sovereign bond spreads in the sample in the following maximum proportions: 56% the 
international risk aversion; 21% the expected fiscal position (i.e. expected budget balance 
and expected debt ratio), 14% the liquidity proxy, and 9% the announcement of bank 
rescue packages. We consider these proportions as being the maximum since other 30
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uncontrolled explanatory factors may also play some additional role.
17 Hence, 
international risk aversion seems to be the largest relative contributor to the widening of 
spreads during the period covered by our analysis. This period has indeed been 
characterised by high investors’ uncertainty and our proxy of international risk seems to 
capture this effect quite well. In particular, international risk aversion seems to matter 
more for countries with weaker fiscal positions.
18 The fiscal indicators and the fiscally-
related factors, i.e. the ANN variable, contribute for about one third to the widening in 
sovereign bond yield spreads and seem to play a more important role than the liquidity 
factor. The expected debt-to-GDP ratio relative to Germany, though having a small 
regression coefficient, seems to be the largest contributor (about one third) among our 
proxies for country creditworthiness during the period of the analysis.  
Turning to country specific results, the expected fiscal position (i.e. expected 
budget balance and debt ratio) have contributed the most to the change of sovereign bond 
spreads for Finland (up to 39%), followed by Ireland (up to 32%), Greece (29%) and 
Italy (up to 26%). The announcements of bank rescue packages have contributed up to 
12% to the change in the sovereign bond yield spread in Austria, 11% in Portugal and 
about 10% in Belgium, Spain and Ireland. The large contribution of the ANN variable in 
the case of Austria may reflect possible market concerns regarding future liabilities given 
the country’s exposure to the Eastern and Central European banking sector. This 
conjuncture is also buttressed by the fact that Austria is the country in which the 
international risk aversion seems to have played the largest role in explaining the change 
in sovereign spreads compared to the other countries in the sample.  
As regards the liquidity variable, it is found to be, by far, the largest contributor to 
the developments of sovereign bond spreads in France (up to 43%). Corroborated by the 
relatively low international risk aversion, this result is in line with Codogno et al. (2003), 
which found that France was the only country where the liquidity risk proved to be more 
                                                
17 We did not include the constant in the calculation of the relative factor contributions (in the denominator 
of the formula used above) since it was not significant at 5% level (the constant is mostly not significant 
across the dynamic panel models used). 
18 When we estimate our model including the interaction terms between the international risk aversion 
indicator and both expected deficit and expected debt relative to Germany, we find that ceteris paribus the 
impact of international risk aversion on sovereign bond yield spreads is slightly higher for countries with 
higher expected debt and higher expected deficit.  31
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important than the international risk factor. Other countries in which our liquidity proxy 
had a high contribution in explaining the change in the dependent variable are Italy (up to 
29%), the Netherlands (20%) and Belgium (up to 17%). 
To conclude, the results in this section reveal a high explanatory power of our 
basic model and help gauging the relative contribution of factors in explaining the 
widening of sovereign bond spreads in the euro area.  
IV.4. Robustness checks 
In this section, we perform several robustness checks of our results. First, we 
investigate the robustness across various estimation techniques. Second, for the results 
with daily data, we control for the impact of other type of announcements, such as the 
release of lead indicators and main macroeconomic variables for the euro area, Germany, 
France, Italy and the U.S. Third, we control for other potentially omitted variables, such 
as expected external imbalances, expected economic growth rate, and the short term 
interest rate in the euro area as given by ECB’s main refinancing rate.  
1) Robustness across estimation techniques 
Our results remain robust when we apply different estimation techniques to 
Equation (1) as well as when we specify our model in static rather than dynamic form.  
An alternative estimator for dynamic panel data is the Blundell-Bond (system 
GMM) estimator. Since the system GMM estimator
19  is more adequate for highly 
persistent dependent variables with a short time dimension, we applied it only to our 
monthly data and found that the results were robust. Moreover, the significance of the 
announcement variable increases to 1% when this model is used (see Table A2.3, model 
m2 in Appendix 2).  
                                                
19  The system GMM estimator (Blundell-Bond 1998) is used when the dependent variable is highly 
persistent since its lag is not a good instrument for the first-difference. Compared to the Arellano-Bond 
estimator (difference GMM), the system GMM estimates an additional level equation (in a system of 
equations, hence its name) using lagged differences as instruments for levels. These estimation methods 
assume that there is no second order (or higher) autocorrelation in the error term. In the case of our data, 
this condition is met when we use both the first and second lag of the dependent variable as explanatory 
variables.  32
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Turning to the static specification, we estimate Equation (1) with daily data using 
pooled OLS with corrected standard errors (clustered) to correct for the different time 
frequency of our data, as well as the fixed effects estimator to control for country specific 
characteristics and correct for autocorrelation of up to order 2 (the Newey estimator). 
This allows us to compare our results with other studies in the literature, especially in the 
case of the pooled OLS estimator.  
As regards the correction for different time frequency of data, our main concern is 
related to the fiscal data, which are the main variables of interest in our analysis. First, as 
explained in Section II, we were faced with the trade-off between using higher-frequency 
fiscal data available from private forecasters, but limit dramatically the number of 
countries included in the analysis, or employing the European Commission forecasts, 
available for each country at a lower time frequency. The latter choice seems more 
appropriate to capture the developments in the euro area.  
Second, since we use forward-looking fiscal variables, which capture the signal to 
investors on future sovereign credit risks, we cannot interpolate our data for lower 
frequencies (e.g. monthly fiscal data to be used in our alternative monthly analysis), as 
done in some studies using historical data.
20  This method would artificially introduce 
new signals to investors related to the release of fiscal data.  
Hence, as a robustness check in the static model, we proceed to correcting our 
empirical results for the lower time frequency of our fiscal variable. To this end, we 
construct a daily time identifier matching the dates of change in the expected fiscal 
variables. We use this new variable to cluster the standard errors, thus capturing potential 
correlation between observations within the same time cluster. Results are shown under 
models m3 of Tables A2.1 and A2.2, Appendix 2 (robust and cluster-corrected standard 
errors) and illustrate that our fiscal variables (expected budget deficit and debt ratio) 
remain highly statistically significant. We also use a cross-sectional “country” identifier 
to check the robustness of our Intl.Risk variable, which is common across countries (and 
                                                
20 See for instance Alexopoulou et al. (2009).  33
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varies daily across time). Clustering by country yields similar results as above, with the 
Intl.Risk again highly statistically significant (at 1%).
21
The conclusion of these robustness tests is that the explanatory variables of 
interest - the expected fiscal position and the announcement of bank rescue packages - 
remain robust across various estimation techniques. In addition, the very good 
explanatory power of the model is also confirmed by the high goodness of fit measures 
(as given by the adjusted R-square in the pooled OLS model and the R-square within in 
the fixed effects model of about 70%). The results are presented in Appendix 2. 
2) Controlling for macroeconomic news events 
We also control whether during the period of our analysis investors’ perception of 
sovereign risk has been driven by other types of announcements. The release of 
macroeconomic data and other lead indicators is likely to affect investors’ perception of 
sovereign risk in the short run, especially on a daily basis. To control for the impact of 
these events, we collected the dates of macroeconomic announcements during the period 
of our analysis following Andersson et al. (2006). They investigate the intra-day impact 
on bond yield spreads in the euro area of a series of macro indicators released for the euro 
area, Germany, France, Italy and the U.S.  
We use the indicators that were found statistically significant in the above 
mentioned study and add several other indicators, which are all listed in Appendix 3. 
Given the low frequency of most macroeconomic data releases, we cannot control 
directly in the regression equation for the surprise effect of the macroeconomic 
announcements (the difference between the actual data and the median expected by the 
market, available from Bloomberg); this would reduce our daily sample size from over 
four thousand to about 40 observations. Hence, we net-out the impact of macroeconomic 
announcements by estimating Equation (1) (excluding the lagged dependent variable
22) on 
a sample that excludes: (i) the days of announcements (model m2 in Table A2.4, 
                                                
21 Results available upon request. 
22 We do not use the dynamic model since the first lag of the dependent variable may also be eliminated 
together with the macroeconomic events and results may not comparable (in addition, we would lose a 
large number of observations). Hence, all models are estimating using fixed effects (FE). Model m1 in 
column 1 of Table A2.4, Appendix 2, is the FE model with the whole sample shown for comparison.   34
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Appendix 2) and (ii) the first day following each announcement (model m3 in the same 
table). By eliminating the days of (or following) macro data releases, our conclusions do 
not change: the variables of interest that may be affected - the announcement of bank 
rescue packages, as well as the fiscal position variables, remain highly statistically 
significant and have the same sign. Moreover, the sizes of their coefficients increase 
slightly, which may be an indication of the fact that the macro announcements do not 
interfere with the impact of the fiscal variables (as found in Andersson et al. (2006), the 
bulk of the impact may be intra-day). 
3) Controlling for other explanatory variables 
We also control for additional macroeconomic fundamentals and policy variables 
that may have an impact on sovereign bond spreads and check whether our variables of 
interest remain robust. The additional macroeconomic fundamentals that we use are the 
expected economic growth rate and a proxy for the expected external imbalances (the 
saving-investment balance of the private sector as a share of GDP). Both variables are 
calculated following the same procedure as previously used, i.e. the average over the 
current and the next year as projected in the European Commission’s forecast, relative to 
that for Germany. For the policy variable, we investigate the impact of the short term 
interest rate, as proxied by the ECB’s main refinancing operations rate for the period of 
our analysis.  
Table A2.5 in Appendix 2 shows the estimation results of our basic dynamic 
panel model to which we add the new variables separately: the expected S-I balance of 
the private sector in model m1; the expected real GDP growth rate in model m2 and the 
ECB policy rate in model m3.  
The results of these tests show that our explanatory variables of interest remain 
statistically significant even when we control for additional variables. The expected 
economic growth rate does not seem to have had an impact on the widening of spreads, 
whereas larger expected external imbalances (i.e. higher current account deficits) are 
associated to higher sovereign bond yield spreads for the period of our analysis. On the 
other hand, the ECB policy rate is highly statistically significant and has a positive sign, 
i.e. a lower reference interest rate has contributed to lowering sovereign spreads in the 35
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euro area. This result is in line with that found in Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) for the 
period January 1999 to April 2008.  
V.  Conclusions and areas for future research 
Since the intensification of the financial crisis in September 2008 up to end-
March 2009, long-term government bond yield spreads relative to Germany have 
increased dramatically for most euro area countries. In March 2009 the spread between 
the Greek and the German government bonds was almost 270 bps from about 30 bps, the 
average spread after Greece’s accession to EMU.  
In line with the existing empirical literature, this paper finds that sovereign bond 
yield spreads in the euro area reflect concerns about a country’s credit risk and liquidity 
risk as well as higher international risk aversion. Higher expected budget deficits and/or 
higher expected government debt relative to Germany have contributed to higher 
government bond yield spreads in the euro area over the period end-July 2007 to end-
March 2009. The results are robust if we restrict the period of analysis to after the crisis 
has intensified, i.e. the period from end-August 2008 to end-March 2009. The expected 
budget balance seems to be more robust than the expected debt across the various 
specifications. We interpret this result as pointing to a greater relevance of the fiscal 
deficit in shaping investors expectations in periods of heightened uncertainty.  
In addition to standard measures of government creditworthiness we also take into 
account the impact that the announcements of bank rescue packages have had on 
government bond yield spreads. Interestingly, we found that the government commitment 
to support ailing financial institutions led to a re-assessment of sovereign credit risk from 
the part of investors, through a transfer of risk from the banking sector to the government. 
Moreover, we also find that this perception is not influenced by the amount of resources 
explicitly committed by governments to the bank rescue packages. The size of rescue 
packages does not have, on average, a statistically significant effect on sovereign bond 
yield spreads, especially when Ireland is excluded from the analysis. In our view, this can 
be explained by the fact that investors’ discrimination among sovereign borrowers was 
triggered by governments’ credible commitment to extend support to the banking sector, 
and not by the mere size of this support. Investors’ perceptions may have been driven by 36
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expectations that governments would provide as much support as needed to shore up 
ailing banks regardless of the amounts explicitly announced in the first place.  
The liquidity of government bond markets has also played a role in the widening 
of sovereign bond yield spreads. Countries with a more liquid bond market seem to enjoy 
relatively lower bond yield spreads during periods of financial turmoil. Finally, and in 
line with the existing empirical literature, we also found that international risk aversion is 
an important factor in explaining sovereign bond yield spreads.  
Our findings are robust to the use of different time frequencies (daily and 
monthly), various estimation techniques, and to the inclusion of additional control 
variables. In this respect, we also found that the reduction in the ECB main refinancing 
operations rate contributed significantly to narrowing sovereign bond spreads for the 
period under consideration. In line with Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) we interpret 
this variable as capturing (inter-alia) risk aversion in the euro-area. Similarly, private 
external imbalances relative to Germany have an influence on sovereign bond spreads, 
whereas the expected economic growth rate does not seem to matter for the period 
covered in our analysis. Controlling for other types of announcements, such as the release 
of macroeconomic data and lead indicators for the euro area, Germany, France, Italy and 
the U.S., does not change our conclusions regarding the impact of announcements of 
bank rescue packages on sovereign spreads. 
Our model has a very high predictive power of both average and country-specific 
sovereign bond spreads in the sample. Using the (average) coefficient estimates from the 
basic model over the period from 31 July 2007 to 25 March 2009, we calculate the 
relative contribution of each explanatory variable in our sample to the daily change in 
average sovereign bond spreads both for each country and for the whole sample. This 
allows us to gauge the relative importance of each factor in explaining movements in 
sovereign bond spreads. For the sample as a whole we find that each explanatory variable 
contributes to the change in daily sovereign bond yield spreads in the following 
maximum proportions: 56% the international risk aversion; 21% the expected fiscal 
position (expected budget balance and debt), 14% the liquidity proxy, and 9% the 
announcement of bank rescue packages. The large relevance of international risk aversion 37
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for changes in sovereign bond yield spreads can be explained by the extraordinary 
severeness of the financial crisis during the period of our analysis. Moreover, the fact that 
fiscally-relevant variables account for about one-third of the movements in euro area 
sovereign spreads during the financial crisis points to the importance of preserving the 
public’s trust in the soundness of public finances. This is essential to anchor market 
expectations about a government ability to meet its future debt obligations. Therefore, an 
important lesson from the financial crisis is that countries should consolidate during good 
economic times in order to build a “fiscal cushion” that provides sufficient room for 
manoeuvre during an economic downturn or a crisis. Many euro area countries failed to 
do so and entered the crisis with high fiscal deficits and debt ratios and thus, limited the 
scope of their fiscal actions at a time when it was needed the most. 
Future lines of research could focus on the role of country-specific financial 
sector vulnerabilities in explaining sovereign bond spreads. A more in depth analysis of 
the impact of monetary policy announcements could provide a comprehensive view of 
the drivers of euro area sovereign bond spreads in crisis times. Finally, extending the 
econometric analysis to assess the developments of bond spreads on a country-by-country 
basis could provide additional insights as to the specific role of fiscal variables.   38
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Appendix 1 – Data description 
Table A1: Data definition, frequency and source 
Variable Definition  Frequency  Source 
10-yr government bond yields    Current yield on 10-
year government bonds 
Daily   Bloomberg 
10-yr government bond 
spreads   
Differential in the 
current government 
bond yield vis-à-vis the 
German Bund  
Daily   Authors’ 
calculations based 
on government 
bond yields data  
Government CDS premia  Cost of ensuring  
against the default of 
government debt 
Daily Bloomberg 
iTraxx Financials Senior   CDS Index covering 25 
European financial 
institutions including 
the UK and Switzerland 
Daily Bloomberg 
International risk aversion  Differential between 
US AAA corporate 
bond yields and US 10-
year government bond 
yields 
Daily Bloomberg   
Announcement of bank rescue 
packages   
=1 since the day of 
announcements of  
broad-based bank 
rescue packages   
=0 before  
Daily   Authors’ 
calculation 
Size recapitalisation   Cumulative size of 
bank recapitalisations  
Daily   Authors’ 
calculation 
Size guarantee   Cumulative size of 
bank guarantees.   
Daily Authors’ 
calculation 
Liquidity   Gross government debt 
issuance at all 
maturities as share of 
total euro area issuance  
vis-à-vis Germany  
Quarterly   ECB Securities 
Issues Statistics  
Expected government budget 
balance  
Differential in the 
projected government 
budget balance vis-à-
vis Germany  
Biannual  








as ratio to country 
GDP41
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Table A2.3: Panel regression with monthly data 
Variable 




Dynamic panel     
 Blundell-Bond  
(system GMM)
Spread (t-1)  0.9714***   1.1656*** 
Spread (t-2)  -  -0.2374*** 
Ann Fin Pack        0.0438*   0.0840*** 
Exp budget bal       0.0157***        -0.0207** 
Exp gov. debt       0.0001         0.0019* 
Int'l Risk       0.0312**         0.0330** 
Liquidity (GDI)     -0.0322***        -0.0544*** 
_cons     -0.0048         0.0121 
Number obs. (N)  196  186 
AR test (Ho= no AR)     
AR(1) p-value           0.0146 
AR(2) p-value           0.2244 
AR(3) p-value           0.3560 
Note: The second lag of the dependent variables is included in m2  
to satisfy the AR condition of no second order correlation (excluding  
it would bring the p-value of the AR(2) test at 0.0731). 
2) Robustness checks excluding macroeconomic news events 




Whole sample  
m2
FE (Newey) 




No macro. events at 
time t+1 
ANN     0.3328***    0.3816***   0.3238*** 
Exp. Budget Bal.  -0.0572***  -0.0735***  -0.0547*** 
Int'l Risk    0.0800***           0.0700*            0.0400 
Liquidity (GDI)  -0.2875***  -0.3173***  -0.2947*** 
Time trend     0.0013***   0.0014***  0.0016*** 
Country dummies  included  included  included 
_cons   -0.1546***  -0.1588***  -0.1610*** 
Number obs. (N)  4222  1147  1018 
R-sq 0.72  0.72  0.70 
Note: All three models are estimated using fixed effects (FE). Model m1 is the FE model with the whole 
sample shown for comparison. Model m2 excludes the days of macroeconomic announcements, while 
model m3 excludes the first day following each announcement.   43
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1131
December 2009
3) Robustness checks: controlling for other explanatory variables 
Table A2.5: Dynamic panel regression with daily data
  Variable  m1
CAB private sector 
m2
GDP growth rate 
m3
ECB policy rate 
Spread gov (t-1)     0.9816***   0.9829***     0.9865*** 
ANN    0.0052**          0.0045*     0.0085*** 
Exp. budget bal.  -0.0006**  -0.0009***  -0.0006** 
Exp. gov debt     0.0001***   0.0001***  0.0001* 
Liquidity (GDI)     -0.0037***  -0.0035***    -0.0033*** 
Int'l risk      0.0040***   0.0041***     0.0037*** 
Exp private CAB  -0.0002** -  - 
Exp GDP growth   -           0.0014  - 
ECB policy rate   -  -     0.0035*** 
_cons  0.0017           0.0019  -0.0124** 
Note: The expected private current account balance (CAB) and GDP growth rate are also expressed in 
relative terms to Germany and are calculated using the same methodology as the one for the fiscal variables 
(source of data: European Commission Forecast). ECB policy rate is the main refinancing operations rate 
for the period under analysis (31.07.2007 – 25.03.2009) 44
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Appendix 3 – Other Announcements of Macroeconomic Data and Lead Indicators 
(released during 31/07/2007 – 25/03/2009) controlled for according to Andersson et 
al. (2006) (additional indicators included) 
US activity and employment 
US GDP advance 
US GDP final 
US industrial production 
US initial jobless claims 
US retail sales 
US factory orders 
US durable goods orders 
US Forward-looking
US University of Michigan consumer    
       sentiment Index 
US ISM manufacturing confidence US 
US ISM non-manufacturing confidence 
US Chicago PMI 
US consumer confidence 
US Philadelphia Fed index 
US prices 
US consumer price index 
Euro area activity and employment 
EA industrial production 
EA GDP  
EA retail sales 
EA unemployment 
Euro area Forward-looking 
EA business confidence  
EA consumer confidence 
Euro area prices 
EA HICP 
National Activity and Employment 
DE industrial production 
DE GDP  
DE unemployment 
FR industrial production 
FR GDP 
FR unemployment 
IT industrial production 
IT unemployment 
National forward-looking 
ZEW economic sentiment DE 
IFO business confidence DE 
IFO expectations DE 
FR business confidence 
IT business confidence 
National prices 
DE consumer price index 
FR consumer price index 
IT consumer price index 45
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